{"id":21847,"date":"2015-05-28T09:00:49","date_gmt":"2015-05-28T12:00:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.rioonwatch.org\/?p=21847"},"modified":"2019-01-29T12:08:46","modified_gmt":"2019-01-29T15:08:46","slug":"two-hundred-years-of-conning-the-british-the-history-of-the-expression-e-para-ingles-ver-or-its-for-the-english-to-see-and-its-modern-offshoots","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/?p=21847","title":{"rendered":"Two Centuries of Conning the ‘British’: The History of the Expression ‘\u00c9 Para Ingl\u00eas Ver,’ or ‘It’s for the English to See’ and Its Modern Offshoots"},"content":{"rendered":"

Clique aqui para Portugu\u00eas<\/em><\/strong><\/a>\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>\"\"<\/em><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

In 1807, the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed an act abolishing the international traffic of enslaved people\u00a0within the British Empire. Much of the pressure to pass the act had come from religious groups led by the Quakers, who had in 1787 begun a humanitarian crusade<\/a>\u00a0against slavery, based in liberal values of freedom and the idea that all men are born equal. However, there were a variety of factors which led Britain to eradicate a system that had brought it considerable profits (it is estimated that Britons\u00a0transported 3\u00a0million Africans between 1700 and 1810<\/a>), one of which being that slavery no longer made economic sense, as the Industrial Revolution was flourishing with free trade and labour.<\/p>\n

Following abolition in Great Britain, British abolitionists began targeting other nations. In 1810 Great Britain signed an agreement of alliance with Portugal, which had started taking Africans as slaves to Brazil as early as 1533. The agreement included plans for the gradual abolition of the slave trade and was followed by a treaty in 1815 that better defined the path to abolition. However, as the slave trade remained one of the most important aspects of Portugal\u2019s colonial economy, little was done to put the agreements into action.<\/p>\n

With the independence of Brazil in 1822, Great Britain\u00a0hoped for increased cooperation from the young country, particularly considering Brazil was receiving more enslaved\u00a0Africans\u00a0than any other country at that time<\/a>. In return for international recognition of its independence, Great Britain demanded that Brazil sign an agreement similar to that which had been signed\u00a0with Portugal. In 1827 a treaty was ratified promising that the import of slaves to Brazil would end within three years. During\u00a0this period, the number of Africans entering Brazil grew rapidly. Fearing the (supposed) future restrictions, traders increased their business, expanding\u00a0from around 25,000\u00a0sold in 1825 to 44,250 in 1829<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\"Landing<\/a><\/p>\n

There was strong resistance to the proposed plan for a number of reasons. Firstly, it threatened to destroy the agricultural economy of Brazil, which heavily relied on the slave workforce. Secondly, it would put the politically influential, elite slave traders out of business. Additionally, abolition was seen as a threat to national sovereignty; it was argued\u00a0that, rather than for humanitarian motives, Great Britain\u00a0wanted to reduce Brazilian influence in Africa in order to extend its own empire.<\/p>\n

However, on November 7,<\/span>\u00a01831 the definitive treaty\u2014known as Feij\u00f3\u2019s Law, after a priest who was instrumental in negotiations\u2014declared that all Africans\u00a0to enter Brazil from that date onward would be free. The first few years of the agreement were relatively successful: although the slave trade never stopped, only 26,095 slaves entered the country between 1831 and 1836. However, between 1836 and 1840, this number exploded to 201,140<\/a>. Thus, Feij\u00f3\u2019s Law came to be known as a law \u201cpara ingl\u00eas ver”\u2014for the English to see. Slave traders, who were some of the richest men in Brazilian society, succeeded in preventing the law from becoming practice and the number of slaves entering Brazil actually increased dramatically.<\/p>\n

Slave traders\u00a0were able to\u00a0mitigate the impacts of the law\u00a0because they were part of a dominant elite which controlled all aspects of Brazilian society. They had networks of suppliers in Africa, links with commercial agents in various countries, and employed many people. Furthermore, they had strong connections in courts of law and in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as support from the police and other local authorities. The 1827 treaty had given Great Britain\u00a0the right to stop and detain suspected Brazilian slave ships, but under the 1831 treaty, which overruled the former agreement, suspects would be tried through the Brazilian justice system. The Brazilian justice system was full of those who benefitted from the slave trade. Under the law, slave owners were now considered kidnappers and subject to heavy financial penalties; nevertheless, with the support of those in power, impunity was almost guaranteed for infractors. Furthermore,\u00a0many of the ships that might have been used for encorcing\u00a0the law were deployed\u00a0to quell revolts in the north and south of the country,\u00a0rather than controlling the port of Rio de Janeiro (the world\u2019s number one slave destination<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The notion of “para ingl\u00eas ver,” therefore, suggested\u00a0the signing of the law was purely Brazil’s measure to placate Great Britain, when really there was no intention of carrying out the promises.<\/p>\n

What “para ingl\u00eas ver” means today<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Today, a \u201cpara ingl\u00eas ver\u201d\u00a0(PIV)\u00a0law, policy or project is one\u00a0which, from the outside, appears to address\u00a0a problem, but which in practice is merely a superficial change, a temporary fix or public relations exercise intended to appease community interests and appeal to domestic\u00a0and international public opinion. It does little to benefit those it purports to help, either because implementation on a well-designed policy is poorly conducted and easily corruptible, or because it is actually\u00a0designed for political motives rather than social or philanthropic\u00a0ones. This situation occurs when public officials lack the genuine desire or political will to institute the necessary change, and is usually accompanied by an extensive PR campaign aimed at promoting the policy. Rio’s favelas, whose origins are inextricably linked<\/a> to the end of slavery in Brazil, and whose territories and citizens\u00a0have historically been neglected by policy-makers, are particularly affected by these types of policies.<\/p>\n

We can separate recent PIV projects in Rio de Janeiro into three categories. First are the very visible, expensive architectural projects which look nice but are seen as\u00a0pandering to tourists rather than serving favela residents\u2019 true needs. Second are the projects which are launched with great fanfare and wide-ranging promises, but are then only partially completed, poorly maintained, or dropped altogether. And finally, the mega-events legacy projects that generate pleasing soundbites but have little connection to reality. Here are some examples:<\/p>\n

The PAC and Cable Car in Alem\u00e3o<\/strong><\/h3>\n

\"Complexo<\/a><\/p>\n

Complexo do Alem\u00e3o<\/a>‘s cable car was launched\u00a0on June 8,<\/span>\u00a02011, at a cost of R$210 million (about US$70 million). The population of Alem\u00e3o is around 70,000 according to the 2010 census, yet the maximum capacity of the cable car\u2014including tourists\u2014is 30,000 per day, which has led people to question whether it is an attraction for visitors rather than a much-needed method of transport<\/a> for locals. Debates over capacity are negligible, however, as despite the reduced cost for residents (R$1), only 28% of Alem\u00e3o\u2019s residents are registered<\/a> and only around 17% use the cable car\u00a0on a daily basis, while 30% of users are tourists<\/a>. Local activist Alan Brum argued<\/a> from the beginning of proposals for the cable car that residents would not walk uphill to get to a station, that what was needed instead were other modes of alternative transport and improved road access. He also highlighted that potential tourist spending would only affect a select number\u00a0of businesses around the stations, while\u00a0little would reach the majority of the community in between.\u00a0Most importantly, however, Alem\u00e3o’s cable car was built by the PAC<\/a> (Growth Acceleration Program) following an extensive public consultation process in the community, during which residents clearly delineated priorities: sewerage and sanitation were at the top of the list. Yet these have failed to materialize<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Also well known for misplaced public priorities, the PAC program in Manguinhos<\/a>\u00a0chose to overlook\u00a0sewage which spills into the streets<\/a>\u00a0and instead build a\u00a0state-of-the-art library<\/a>\u00a0and have world-renowned architect Jorge Jauregui design the elevation of the neighborhood\u2019s train tracks<\/a>, while sewage regularly spills onto the streets<\/a>, visited by the Pope in 2013. And in Rocinha, where initial PAC investments favored a highly visible Niemeier-designed overpass to replace an already existing one, and a sports complex visible from the main road but which reeks of sewage<\/a>, residents are fighting the City’s intended cable car project<\/a> in favor of their priority:\u00a0sanitation.<\/p>\n

Provid\u00eancia and the “Marvelous Port”<\/strong><\/h3>\n

\"Provid\u00eancia<\/a><\/p>\n

Billed as the “second Sugarloaf Mountain” by Mayor Eduardo Paes, the city’s second favela cable car connects Provid\u00eancia<\/a>, Rio’s Central train station,\u00a0and Gamboa, covering a distance of 721 meters<\/a>. A year after work had finished on the cable car in Provid\u00eancia, none of the gondolas had moved<\/a>. Since a widely promoted launch<\/a>, its timetable has been\u00a0limited, only operating for a few hours in the morning and then a few in the afternoon. This means\u00a0many\u00a0residents have been unable to use it at all during the week. In order to build the station, the City\u00a0destroyed Pra\u00e7a Americo Brum<\/a>, the\u00a0community’s primary leisure space, with the replacement space promised never built. Dozens of families were forcibly removed<\/a>\u00a0for the project and ultimately the City had to stop further works in the area due to the community’s legal victory<\/a> over a lack of public consultation.\u00a0In an interview, resident Roberto Marinho lamented the fact that favelas often receive spectacular (ly expensive) constructions<\/a>, when what they really require is similar investment in more basic needs, such as sanitation<\/a>. He says that if mobility were genuinely the focus of the City, the government would have implemented an elevator, like the one in Cantagalo<\/a>. It is worth noting, however, that after a launch with great fanfare, the top tower of\u00a0Cantagalo’s elevator<\/a>, finished in 2010, has never operated. Only the lower tower is operable.<\/p>\n

Morar Carioca<\/strong><\/h3>\n

\"Plans<\/a><\/p>\n

In theory, Morar Carioca<\/a> was set to be\u00a0the most progressive, comprehensive favela upgrading program in Rio\u2019s history: as a primary Olympic legacy, Rio’s mayor promised all missing infrastructure services would be delivered to all of Rio’s favelas by 2020. With a budget of R$8 billion<\/a>\u00a0(about US$2.7 billion), the beautifully written program<\/a>\u00a0aimed to \u201cintegrate all favelas into the formal city\u201d through extensive\u00a0improvements in sanitation systems and transport networks, installation of drainage systems, road surfacing and street lights, and construction of green spaces, public recreational areas and social service centers. Morar Carioca was designed to build on the successes and limitations of Rio’s internationally recognized Favela-Bairro program from the 1990s, featuring greater degrees and constant consultation between the teams of architects and residents who were to be affected. After much promise and hope was generated among favela residents, organizers, and urbanists, however, the program was abandoned and its name reappropriated. Lack of investment and political will has seen the actual\u00a0program slowly dismantled<\/a>\u00a0while its name is still widely used by City officials who have even successfully won an international award\u00a0based on the virtually nonexistent program<\/a>. Today, “Morar Carioca” has become a label associated with forced evictions<\/a>, as the City came to use the program’s\u00a0positive brand to “get away” with evictions in a number of communities.<\/p>\n

UPP Social<\/strong><\/h3>\n

\"UPP<\/a><\/p>\n

UPP Social was the parallel program to the police pacification of selected favelas, to provide social and economic integration<\/a> by articulating and realizing the missing public services beyond security in police-pacified favelas. It would do this through creating forums for discussion in the community, stimulating leisure and cultural activities, and providing professional training programs for youth. The program’s official\u00a0website<\/a> was regularly updated with reports and professional photographs from community events organized by the program, and last year UPP Social was recognized\u00a0by the United Nations<\/a> for being \u201ca solid inspiration for intervention in marginalized\u00a0regions of underdeveloped or developing countries.\u201d Yet many living in pacified communities did not even know<\/a> what the program was. UPP Social had promised high levels of participation from favela residents, but in most cases the residents’ suggestions or demands never came close to fruition<\/a>. In one interview, a resident from Cerr\u00f3-Cora<\/a>\u00a0summed up the program as typical\u00a0\u201cpara ingl\u00eas ver\u201d<\/a>: \u201cI don\u2019t think they\u2019re interested in the opinion of favela residents. They ask because they have to, so they can say they asked.\u201d The social element, so important as a complement to the policing program, never arrived, meaning the UPP is more a narrow policing policy than the comprehensive program it could have been. Such was the stigma attached to the failed program that in August 2014 the state rebranded the program as Rio+Social<\/a> in an attempt to give it fresh impetus.<\/p>\n

Eduardo Paes’ TED Talk<\/strong><\/h3>\n

\"Eduardo<\/a><\/p>\n

In his 2012 TED Talk<\/a>\u2014viewed almost 750,000 times on the TED website\u2014Mayor Eduardo Paes<\/a>\u00a0lays out his\u00a0\u201cfour commandments of cities,\u201d highlighting the favela as one of the four key areas of mayoral policy in Rio. He first emphasizes the need for basic services in favelas. He shows\u00a0images of a clean, modern primary school built in Col\u00f4nia Juliano Moreira<\/a>, and a family clinic in an unnamed favela. Although there has been investment in certain favelas, wide-ranging improvements in fundamental services have not been seen. In particular, basic sanitation is appalling (not only in favelas but especially so) and in 2013 it was estimated that at least 30% of the city did not have a formal sanitation system<\/a>. In the talk\u00a0Paes also states that favelas need to have infrastructure to bring them into the formal city and that they are “part of the solution.” This contrasts brutally with the dismantling of Morar Carioca<\/a> and simultaneous eviction of 67,000<\/a> Rio citizens under his administration.<\/p>\n

Institute of Public Security (ISP) statistics<\/strong><\/h3>\n

\"BOPE<\/a><\/p>\n

In 2007 the ISP registered the highest number of autos de resist\u00eancia<\/em>, the term for deaths caused when suspects \u201cresist arrest,\u201d\u00a0in Rio\u2019s history\u20141,330 in just one year\u2014confirming Rio’s\u00a0Military Police force one of (if not) the most violent police forces in the world. Shortly afterwards, anthropologist Ana Paula Miranda was sacked as head of the institute and replaced by Military Police Colonel Mario Sergio Duarte. Under the governorship of Sergio Cabral, homicides dropped in Rio, making it a statistically less dangerous place. However, Miranda publicly questioned the new data under her successor’s leadership<\/a>. What was hidden beneath these data, which have been given increasing prominence\u00a0in the lead-up to the mega-events, was the emergence of more and more \u201cviolent deaths with unknown intention\u201d (VDUIs) which are not registered as murders. In 2006,\u00a01,676 were victims of VDUI, but by 2009 there were 5,647 <\/a>cases, accounting for 60% of all violent deaths. The state then reevaluated some of that year\u2019s cases, bringing the number down to 3,587; yet Cerqueira estimates some 3,165 murders in 2009 were not reported as such. Furthermore, disappearances in these years shot up disproportionately<\/a>, especially in areas such as Campo Grande<\/a>\u00a0in the city’s extreme militia-dominated<\/a> West Zone, where disappearances rose to 278 in 2013, as murder rates dropped by 60% and police officers qualified for R$9,000 in bonuses. As state politicians were publicly lauding the significant drop in homicides, in reality, Rio was as violent as it had ever been.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Clique aqui para Portugu\u00eas\u00a0 In 1807, the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed an act abolishing the international traffic of enslaved people\u00a0within the British Empire. Much of the pressure to pass the act had come […]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"author":51,"featured_media":22041,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1288,335,1282,328,1329],"tags":[2271,1645,150,521,1098,609,32,272,11,188,234,1101,637,673,147,37,744,148,144,809,12,535,373,279,145],"writer":[1095],"translator":[],"illustrator":[],"photographer":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-21847","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-highlight","8":"category-policies","9":"category-research-analysis","10":"category-understanding-rio","11":"category-by-international-observers","12":"tag-for-the-english-to-see","13":"tag-piv","14":"tag-cable-car","15":"tag-campo-grande","16":"tag-cerro-cora","17":"tag-colonia-juliano-moreira","18":"tag-complexo-do-alemao","19":"tag-mayor-eduardo-paes","20":"tag-forced-evictions","21":"tag-history","22":"tag-inadequate-maintenance","23":"tag-library","24":"tag-manguinhos","25":"tag-misplaced-public-priorities","26":"tag-morar-carioca","27":"tag-north-zone","28":"tag-policy-critique","29":"tag-port-region","30":"tag-morro-da-providencia","31":"tag-public-security","32":"tag-rocinha","33":"tag-sanitation","34":"tag-sewerage","35":"tag-slavery","36":"tag-upp-social","37":"writer-patrick-ashcroft"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21847","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/51"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=21847"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21847\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/22041"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=21847"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=21847"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=21847"},{"taxonomy":"writer","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fwriter&post=21847"},{"taxonomy":"translator","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftranslator&post=21847"},{"taxonomy":"illustrator","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fillustrator&post=21847"},{"taxonomy":"photographer","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fphotographer&post=21847"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}